Thomas Friedman has lost his mind

That's right. The venerable New York Times columnist has lost his mind. That's the only way you can explain his advice to Barak Obama to "channel Dick Cheney." I provide the relevant quote:

There is a cold war in the Middle East today between America and Iran, and until and unless it gets resolved, I see Iran using its proxies, its chess pieces — Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria and the Shiite militias in Iraq — to stymie America and its allies across the region.

And that brings me back to the Obama-Cheney ticket: When it comes to how best to deal with Iran, each has half a policy — but if you actually put them together, they’d add up to an ideal U.S. strategy for Iran. Dare I say, they complete each other.

Vice President Cheney is the hawk-eating hawk, who regularly swoops down and declares that the U.S. will not permit Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. Trust me, the Iranians take his threats seriously.

...

“For coercive diplomacy to work you need to be able to threaten what the regime values most — its own survival,” said the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Robert Litwak, author of the book “Regime Change.” “But for coercive diplomacy to work, you also need to be ready to take yes for an answer.”

Mr. Obama, by contrast, has “yes” down pat. As he said on “Meet the Press” last week: “I would meet directly with the leadership in Iran. I believe that we have not exhausted the diplomatic efforts that could be required to resolve some of these problems — them developing nuclear weapons, them supporting terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas.”

...

But Mr. Obama’s stress on engaging Iran, while a useful antidote to the Bush boycott policy, is not sufficient. Mr. Obama evinces little feel for generating the leverage you’d need to make such diplomacy work. When negotiating with murderous regimes like Iran’s or Syria’s, you want Tony Soprano by your side, not Big Bird. Mr. Obama’s gift for outreach would be so much more effective with a Dick Cheney standing over his right shoulder, quietly pounding a baseball bat into his palm.

Here is the problem. First, if you are going to threaten to use violence, you have to be ready to follow through on it. I'm not a firearm owner, but I've been told that if you point a weapon at another person, you must be prepared to use it should the situation require it. As I discussed previously, there is no circumstance under which the use of military force against Iran would produce a positive result for the United States. So to continue the metaphor of a firearm, informed policy makers are unwilling to use the weapon (and therefore should not point it) and those willing to use the weapon will have it blow up in their face. Second, coercive diplomacy also requires that there is a point, as the 'thumb screw' of pressure induced by increasinly urgent threats of military violence, at which the target policy makers will capitulate rather than face war. But in Iran, the leadership is strengthened by external threats of violence, not weakened. Ahmadinejad and his government knows that a full on invasion is impossible, so they do not fear for their own survival or for the survival for their state (even if they did, the example st by Iraq is probably strong enough to salve those fears). Any damage done by military strikes would be superficial, easily paid for at today's high oil prices, and would serve to rally a public that would otherwise be critical of the government behind their leaders. In this situation, coercive diplomacy would fail. Either the US will have to back down, offering a domestic coup for Ahmadinejad and further damaging US standing internationally by making it look like a bully. And Ahmadinejad would continue to do as he liked. The only way to deal with Iran is to bring international pressure to bear. That Friedman doesn't understand this, after his own mistakes in judgment in the run up to the Iraq war, is a shame. The public needs educated, thoughtful commentary on foreign issues, and there are many cases where Friedman does this, but here he is egregiously wrong.

Iran and Nuclear Weapons

I thought, for my first post in the Blogosphere, I would tackle the crisis du jour, the conflict with Iran over its possible development of nuclear weapons. That NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical, not the television network) weapons proliferation is not a great idea is a well established concept. While some, notably Kenneth Waltz, argue that more nuclear weapons would make the world more stable (since no one would want to start a war that might escalate), the work by Scott Sagan at Stanford on the difficulties of controlling nuclear weapons, including preventing accidents, outweighs any possible peaceful stabilizing effects. So, we arrive at the somewhat commonsensical conclusion that the spread of nuclear weapons is a bad thing, hence the uproar over Iran's nuclear weapons.

The United States, in the form of is principle foreign policy maker President George Bush, has warned of dire consequences if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, including World War III. To this end the Bush Administration has taken a very aggressive stance towards Iran, its rhetoric increasing volatile. Is this likely to be a fruitful approach? IAEA Director ElBaradei has expressed reservations with the belligerent approach. His caution is well placed. The aggression of the Bush Administration is unlikely to produce an Iran amenable to discussing the issue, much less providing greater cooperation. Why? Lets start with the Iranian national identity as the lens through which it views the world. Today, over fifty years after the US and British governments helped overthrow Iran's rightfully elected Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, and installed a fairly repressive leader in the figure of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Iranian public carries a very strong resentment of the United States. There is, justifiably, a sense that Iran has historically been a victim of Western powers. No doubt this ties in strongly to the victimization theme in Shi'a Islam. The Iranian government has fostered this 'us versus the world' mentality and the demonization of the West in particular that it requires. The most obvious sign of this policy is the inclusion of "death to America" in the weekly Friday prayers. Politically, the current Iranian government has grown to rely on the victim identity in Iranian society for its legitimacy. With respect to the standard foundations of governing legitimacy like economic performance, provision of services, and in general being agreeable to society's needs, the government is in a weak position. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has done a fairly poor job managing Iran's economy, and the crackdown on social liberties under his regime has not gone down well with the large under 30 population. To support itself, the government must rely on an external enemy to key into the victim identity and justify its continued hold on power. Viewed from this perspective, the belligerence of the Bush Administration will only serve to reinforce the government and its nuclear policy. By offering itself up as a the bogeyman on the nuclear issue, the United States virtually guarantees an end result that no one finds beneficial. Indeed, from a domestic political point of view, Ahmadinejad has no choice but to continue, and even escalate, the confrontation. If he doesn't, odds are someone will be elected who will. Backing Iran into a corner will not work.

What are our options? The foreign policy crowd that sees military options as preferable are agitating for a military strike in the form of bombing known Iranian nuclear facilities. This is so unlikely to be successful as to beggar the imagination. First, the known sites may not be the extent of Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Second, the nuclear genie is out of the bottle in Iran. The knowledge of how to produce the nuclear cycle to this point is already known, and bombing will do nothing to destroy that. Advocates for the military option argue it will buy the world time to figure out a solution to the crisis. They are wrong. Bombing the facilities may buy time, but doing so will ensure that Iran will develop a nuclear weapon. Bombing the facilities will empower Ahmadinejad and like-minded politicians, who will build their political credibility on standing up to Western, read US, bullies and developing nuclear weapons will serve as proof that Iran cannot be bullied and a source of pride as Iran joins the international 'big boys' and sticks it to the West. Ahmadinejad and those like him are what Jacques Hymans calls oppositional nationalists. These leaders see themselves as equal or superior to relevant ‘others’ (pride) and see the relationship as zero sum, us against them (fear). This combination drives these leaders to develop nuclear weapons capabilities. The threat posed by relevant others makes the weapons necessary while the pride of nationalism leads these leaders to believe the weapons can be controlled (contra Sagan’s organizational arguments that weapons are difficult to control) and that the ramifications of obtaining the bomb can be managed.

What can be done? The only option open to the US is unconditional talks with Ahmadinejad. Conditional talks can be played domestically as further efforts to bully Iran, and Ahmadinejad will reject them, as he has to this point. The US will have to be clear, offering Iran a path into the mainstream of the international system: normalized relations with the US, security guarantees, and possible membership in the WTO. In return, the US asks for concessions on the nuclear program and security guarantees vis-a-vis Israel. The US is going to have to act as though it is not in a position of power, because it isn't. Iran will have to be treated as an equal in private, but especially in public, if the victim identity and political power it provides to Ahmadinejad is to be disarmed. For the morality play aspect of the story, it should be noted that the US was in a position of power (soft and hard) in the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 attacks. As Frontline reports, for the first time since the 1979 revolution, the 'death to America' message at Friday prayers was suspended. Iran actively helped the US in Afghanistan, both in overthrowing the Taliban and in getting Afghan president Hamid Karzai elected. In the immediate aftermath of the Iraq invasion, the reformist government submitted a deal to the US, trading nuclear program openness for security guarantees. It was essentially everything the US now wants from Iran. In its post-invasion hubris, the Bush Administration never even responded to the offer. The reformists lost power, Ahmadinejad moved in, and now we have the Iran nuclear crisis, one of our own making...