Russia and what democracy is not

The New York Times, among other news outlets, reports that, shockingly, Vladimir Putin's "United Russia" party swept elections yesterday. These are not elections in the sense that we talk about in true democracies. Putin and the Kremlin bureaucracy worked very efficiently to hobble the opposition parties, denying them access to media, and arresting the odd challenger. While Putin has declared the elections a vote of support for him and his policies, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, limited to 330 election monitors (for the largest state by land mass in the world) to cover 100,000 polling stations by Kremlin stonewalling, has characterized the elections as deeply flawed. From the BBC:

The election "was not fair and failed to meet many OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and standards for democratic elections," the observers from the OSCE's Parliamentary Assembly and the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly told a news conference in Moscow.

The statement criticised "abuse of administrative resources" and "media coverage strongly in favour of the ruling party".

The polls "took place in an atmosphere which seriously limited political competition" and "there was not a level political playing field", it said.

Why does this matter? Putin says democracy, Europe and the US say not. The operation of democracy is dependent on the cultural norms and practices of any given country. So maybe Russian democracy looks fundamentally different than European democracy? This type of argument cannot fly, and here is why. While it is true that the nature of democracy does vary from country to country, there must be a core aspect of the definition that needs to be defended, and publicly. There are two reasons for this:

First, democracy is a concept that has meaning. When the US or the United Kingdom or France or the UN praises the development of democracy in some country, that praise needs to have meaning. Putin, by appealing to the standard of democracy, is showing that the concept has normative power. Leaders who want to be seen as responsible and legitimate claim democratic mandate. Leaders who are clearly not part of a democratic system are delegitimized in the international system. Obviously, this is a matter of degree depending on other issues (country x has a lot of oil, therefore we care a little bit less about their democratic credentials). If we allow the concept of democracy to become so wide that almost anything that vaguely looks like an election in to the democratic club, the concept loses its normative power.

Second, identity is important. It acts a signaling mechanism to other states regarding the basic rules that a given state plays by. The labels we use...democracy, communist, totalitarian, fascist, etc, are important for communicating a set of assumptions about behavior and values. The international system is a social system, not a physical system (e.g. electrons in orbit around an atom nucleus), and these assumptions about behavior and norms are important. The leader of one state cannot know the thoughts of another leader on any given issue, and the fundamental assumptions that leaders have when they view their mutual relationship is incredibly important. It can even be so simple as predisposing a leader to think the other side will be reasonable or not, and that has significant ramifications for cooperation and conflict.

So, we should neither believe Mr. Putin's claims of democratic legitimacy nor allow them go unchallenged. Europe, India, Brazil, Argentina, the US, and the whole club of democratic nations should clearly articulate the position that the Russian elections so not represent an act of democracy, and Russia will not be recognized as a democracy. All it takes is a few pretenders to spoil the democratic party, and leaders and their citizenry need to be vigilant against those who would seek to crash the party.

Thomas Friedman has lost his mind

That's right. The venerable New York Times columnist has lost his mind. That's the only way you can explain his advice to Barak Obama to "channel Dick Cheney." I provide the relevant quote:

There is a cold war in the Middle East today between America and Iran, and until and unless it gets resolved, I see Iran using its proxies, its chess pieces — Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria and the Shiite militias in Iraq — to stymie America and its allies across the region.

And that brings me back to the Obama-Cheney ticket: When it comes to how best to deal with Iran, each has half a policy — but if you actually put them together, they’d add up to an ideal U.S. strategy for Iran. Dare I say, they complete each other.

Vice President Cheney is the hawk-eating hawk, who regularly swoops down and declares that the U.S. will not permit Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. Trust me, the Iranians take his threats seriously.

...

“For coercive diplomacy to work you need to be able to threaten what the regime values most — its own survival,” said the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Robert Litwak, author of the book “Regime Change.” “But for coercive diplomacy to work, you also need to be ready to take yes for an answer.”

Mr. Obama, by contrast, has “yes” down pat. As he said on “Meet the Press” last week: “I would meet directly with the leadership in Iran. I believe that we have not exhausted the diplomatic efforts that could be required to resolve some of these problems — them developing nuclear weapons, them supporting terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas.”

...

But Mr. Obama’s stress on engaging Iran, while a useful antidote to the Bush boycott policy, is not sufficient. Mr. Obama evinces little feel for generating the leverage you’d need to make such diplomacy work. When negotiating with murderous regimes like Iran’s or Syria’s, you want Tony Soprano by your side, not Big Bird. Mr. Obama’s gift for outreach would be so much more effective with a Dick Cheney standing over his right shoulder, quietly pounding a baseball bat into his palm.

Here is the problem. First, if you are going to threaten to use violence, you have to be ready to follow through on it. I'm not a firearm owner, but I've been told that if you point a weapon at another person, you must be prepared to use it should the situation require it. As I discussed previously, there is no circumstance under which the use of military force against Iran would produce a positive result for the United States. So to continue the metaphor of a firearm, informed policy makers are unwilling to use the weapon (and therefore should not point it) and those willing to use the weapon will have it blow up in their face. Second, coercive diplomacy also requires that there is a point, as the 'thumb screw' of pressure induced by increasinly urgent threats of military violence, at which the target policy makers will capitulate rather than face war. But in Iran, the leadership is strengthened by external threats of violence, not weakened. Ahmadinejad and his government knows that a full on invasion is impossible, so they do not fear for their own survival or for the survival for their state (even if they did, the example st by Iraq is probably strong enough to salve those fears). Any damage done by military strikes would be superficial, easily paid for at today's high oil prices, and would serve to rally a public that would otherwise be critical of the government behind their leaders. In this situation, coercive diplomacy would fail. Either the US will have to back down, offering a domestic coup for Ahmadinejad and further damaging US standing internationally by making it look like a bully. And Ahmadinejad would continue to do as he liked. The only way to deal with Iran is to bring international pressure to bear. That Friedman doesn't understand this, after his own mistakes in judgment in the run up to the Iraq war, is a shame. The public needs educated, thoughtful commentary on foreign issues, and there are many cases where Friedman does this, but here he is egregiously wrong.

A quote appropriate for the times: Gustave Gilbert's Nuremberg Diary

From Gilbert's Nuremberg Diary page 278 (emphasis mine):

We got around to the subject of war again and I said that, contrary to his attitude, I did not think that the common people are very thankful for leaders who bring them to war and destruction.

"Why, of course, the people don't want war," Goering shrugged. "Why would some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best that he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece. Naturally, the common people don't want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship."

"There is one difference," I pointed out. "In a democracy the people have some say in the matter through their elected representatives, and in the United States only Congress can declare wars."

"Oh, that is all well and good, but, voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country."

Changing the world with Sarah McLachlan

I thought I would mix things up a bit and have a bit of fun. As a constructivist, I believe that the world can change, for good or for bad. The system we face everyday is in fact perpetuated by us as we act within that system. To paraphrase Alex Wendt, the international system is what we make of it. In the spirit of changing the world, here is Sarah McLachlan. Enjoy!

Identity and peace in Iraq

Once again, I had planned to talk about what is happening in Pakistan, but my lovely wife is coming back from New York in quite early tomorrow morning necessitating an early rise on my part, and a fellowship application has taken up all my time today, so another abbreviated post is the order of the day. The New York Times has run a story on a neighborhood, Bab al Sheik, in Baghdad that has been spared the violence that has torn the rest of the country apart. What makes this neighborhood unique?

“All of these people grew up here together,” said Monther, a suitcase seller here. “From the time of our grandfathers, same place, same food, same everything.”

The people in Bab al Sheik have a shared identity. The know each other, have intermarried, and identify with each other. There are no 'others,' only reflections of the self. It is telling that the dynamic of Bab al Sheik has been repeated, albeit with less success, across Baghdad:

Much of today’s Baghdad sprang into existence in the 1970s, when oil nationalization drew Iraqis from all over the country to work. The city’s population more than tripled over the course of 20 years, and new neighborhoods sprawled east and west. The war and civil conflict have seemed to take a heavier toll in those areas than in some of the older neighborhoods.

In one neighborhood, Dora,

residents were from all over. That never seemed to matter until the basic rules of society fell away after the American occupation began. The only bulwark left against complete chaos was trust between families, and in Dora there was not enough.

Bab al Sheik is also characterized by moderate religious views. I suspect that there is a direct relationship between the communal identity and the moderation of religious views. It is telling that when outside extremist religious actors, both Sunni and Shia attempted to make inroads in the neighborhood, the residents threw them out. Unfortunately, moderation is not the currency of choice in Iraq, and the neighborhood stands neglected by the various parties that control the flow of money. The mosque where moderation is preached is falling into disrepair. What could the US do differently? It is too late now, but the neighborhood approach might have served the US well when it still controlled the country. By allocating resources to neighborhoods and encouraging identities tied to neighborhoods, the US may have built stronger ties between individuals and pre-emptively emphasized that aspect of their identity to head off more divisive identifications. A side benefit to this approach is that, often, as James Scott argues in Seeing Like State, it is locals who are have the on the ground knowledge to put resources to best use or know how day-to-day operations really play out. That means that reconstruction efforts may very well have, well, reconstructed, instead of the current debacle.

Thomas Friedman on Democracy and diversity

I was going to post on the situation in Pakistan, but I spent most of my time trying to get the new background graphic just right. Fortunately, Thomas Friedman has done most of my work for me. Friedman discusses the connection between social diversity and successful democracy. I provide the key quote here:

A senior French official suggested to me that maybe we in the West, rather than trying to promote democracy in the Middle East — a notion tainted by its association with the very Western powers that once colonized the region — should be focusing on promoting diversity, which has historical roots in the area.

It’s a valid point. The very essence of democracy is peaceful rotations of power, no matter whose party or tribe is in or out. But that ethic does not apply in most of the Arab-Muslim world today, where the political ethos remains “Rule or Die.” Either my group is in power or I’m dead, in prison, in exile or lying very low. But democracy is not about majority rule; it is about minority rights. If there is no culture of not simply tolerating minorities, but actually treating them with equal rights, real democracy can’t take root.

But respect for diversity is something that has to emerge from within a culture.

Friedman has a point here. The norms that underpin democracy are critical to it's successful function. The institutions we observe in a democracy are the physical manifestations of the underlying norms, and at the same time they reinforce the norms by structuring society in ways that encourage the observation of norms. The relationship between actors (individuals in society who chose to observe democratic norms) and structure (democratic institutions that inculcate and reward the observance of said norms) is what Anthony Giddens called structuration. It forms the basis of most constructivist approaches in the study of international relations. But I digress. Back to Friedman's point. What he neglects is that it is not diversity per say that inspires the requisite democratic norms. There are plenty of countries that have very limited diversity that are successful democracies (Japan, South Korea) and others that have loads of diversity but democracy is tough to come by (Russia comes to mind). What is critical is the development and acceptance, society-wide, of the norms of non-violent conflict resolution, minority rights (this might be expanded to include a basic set of human rights), transparency, and rule of law and the integration of these norms into the political structures of the state. Attempting to establish the political structures without the norms is bound to fail. the foundation is simply not there. Establishing the norms without the institutions is more likely to be successful (e.g. Gandhi), but without the establishment of supportive institutions, the norms will dies out, starved of structural support. What Friedman perhaps gets at is that pluralism of thought is required. His examples certainly seem to indicate that is his bigger point:

"The Muslim Emperor Akbar, who ruled India in the 16th century at the pinnacle of the Mughal Empire, had Christians, Hindus, Jain and Zoroastrians in his court. Many of his senior officials were Hindus. On his deathbed, Jesuit priests tried to convert him, but he refused. Here was a man who knew who he was, yet he had respect for all religions. Nehru, a Hindu and India’s first prime minister, was a great admirer of Akbar."

Akbar wasn’t just tolerant. He was embracing of other faiths and ideas, which is why his empire was probably the most powerful in Indian history. Pakistan, which has as much human talent as India, could use an Akbar. Ditto the Arab world.

The key here is intellectual diversity. The seems to be a need for an broader identity that sits over more parochial identities. A national identity that corresponds to the state would fit the bill. That national identity would facilitate the incorporation of a democratic identity. Not only does this allow individuals to see others in society as fellow democrats, abiding by the same rules, and fundamentally similar to the self, it may very well facilitate the democratic peace, but that is a topic for another day...

US military loses track of weapons in Iraq

A report today in the New York Times details the problems in the weapons supply chain in Iraq. The end result is that thousands of weapons went are unaccounted for. Probably a bad thing in a country with a violence problem.

International Relations resource of the day

In what I hope to be an ongoing project to popularize the world of online international relations resources, I give you the granddaddy of them all:

The CIA World Factbook

Developed as a resource for State Department and CIA, there is an overview of every country in here, along with pertinent economic, political, and geographic data. Not terribly useful as a citation, but great if you want to know about a country I or someone else refers to that you may not know much about.

Redacted by Brian De Palma in Theaters

What looks to be a very powerful film is out in theaters in the US on November 16th. If I was there, I would be in line to see it. I'm sure going to make a point of seeing it when I get back.

PBS Frontline on Extraordinary Rendition

The excellent PBS investigative series Frontline has a story on the extraordinary rendition program. Towards the end of the piece you'll see a former FBI official making the same point I made regarding the problems of poor prisoner treatment.